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In this paper, we discuss the possibility of strategic behavior and truthful reporting in a two players’
announcement game when there is a cost for getting information. First we show that the best strategy of
each player is to announce the observed signal truthfully if the announcement is made simultaneously.
Second we show that if the order of announcement is given exogenously, the player who moves ﬁrst
reports her information truthfully always. But the optimal strategies of the player who moves later
depends on the information cost, the belief in the information quality and payoﬀs. These can be
explained by three factors, the incentive to be diﬀerentiated, negative eﬀect of the information cost and
the blame-sharing eﬀect. Also we discuss what is a good scheme to induce the subsequent player to
observe her signal and announce truthfully. Finally, we discuss about the welfare of using the waiting
option in an endogenous ordering. We show that player can be better oﬀ in terms of ex-ante compared
to the simultaneous announcement case even if she uses the waiting option for delaying her decision.
This is a interesting result because the possibility of waiting option is usually understood as a main
reason to make player worse-oﬀ compared to the simultaneous movement case. The conditions under
which each player can be better oﬀ or worse oﬀ from using the option are explained. Finally the results
of the experiments that support our model are denoted. Some assertions in this paper can be used as
an alternative explanation for the phenomenon of the coincidence or discrepancy in the sovereign credit
rating or corporate credit rating market by professional analysts and the reputation markets.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D83, L13. L84
Keywords: Strategic imitation and deviation, Strategic ignorance, Truthful announcement, An-
nouncement game, Welfare of waiting option
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we discuss the phenomenon of player’s strategic behavior under the framework of two
players’ announcement game. Usually, the strategic behavior with career concern or reputation is under-
stood as the main reason that induces players’ ineﬃcient decision making when players are competing.
Herding and anti-herding are good examples of ineﬃcient results when players behave strategically with
that motive. Shartstein and stein (1990) ﬁrst introduced a model that explains herding phenomenon
with an example of investment decision. Also Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001) introduced the reverse con-
cept, anti-herding using an example of ﬁnancial analysts’ behavior.2 The herding explains the situation
that player makes the same decision with others and the anti-herding explains the situation that player
makes the diﬀerent decision from others. The important point of both concepts is that player be-
haves strategically with ignoring her own information. So herding is a meaningful concept when player
chooses the same action with other players however she observed diﬀerent signals from others. On the
contrary, the anti-herding is meaningful especially when player deviates from the other players however
she observed same signal with other players.
Each player has an opportunity to observe her signal that partially reveals the information about
true state, but not perfectly. Each player’s objective is to select the strategy to maximize her expected
utility. Her payoﬀ depends on her strategy and also on the other player’s strategy. So the best case for
each player is when she is the only one player who forecasted correctly and the worst case is when she is
the only one player who announced wrong information. The payoﬀ system assumed in this paper gives
two conﬂicting incentives to each player. First, player has an incentive to make same announcement
because the penalty when both are wrong is greater than the penalty when she is the only one player
who was wrong. This is caused from the risk aversions to the situation that she is the unique player
who announced wrong information. That is to say, so called "sharing blame eﬀect" works.3 Second,
player has the other contrary incentive to announce diﬀerent information because the reward when she
is the unique player who announces correct information is the greatest one in payoﬀs system. This is
caused from the desire to be diﬀerentiated from the other player.
This paper follows similar framework with papers that treated the topic of herding and anti-herding,
but introduces the model that explains the herding and anti-herding phenomenon together. Also the
factors such as belief in the information quality, the information cost and the asymmetry in payoﬀsa r e
introduced. In our model, each player’s best strategies are described as a function of these parameters,
so we show that these factors play a critical role in determining each player’s strategy.
The most important new approaches of our model are the assumptions about players’ type and the
information cost. Many papers with a topic of herding or anti-herding usually assumed that players are
heterogeneous in their type. Here, the meaning of being heterogeneous is that players have diﬀerent
ability in inferring information about true state from observed signal. Or it is used for denoting that
the observed signals by each player have diﬀerent information quality. In those settings, whether each
player knows her type or not is an important factor in the analysis. So whether we can get the result
2Sharfstein & Stein (1990) also mentioned the possibility of anti-herding or deviation in their paper. But they just
focused on the explanation of herding eﬀect induced from reputational concern or career concern.
3The term, sharing blame eﬀect was introduced in Sharfstein & Stein (1990).
2of herding or anti-herding that strongly depends on the assumption about heterogeneous types.4 But
in our paper, there is no assumption about player’s types. Each player who participates in this game is
a homogeneous type in the sense that there is no diﬀerence in player’s information updating procedure
from observed signal. Also the signal observed by each player has the same information quality and
each player gives same weight for the observed information. However each player doesn’t know which
signal does the other player observe, she knows that the other player gives same weight to her signal
if it is observed and she also gives same weight to the other player’s information. If we can show the
possibility of strategic deviation and imitation under this assumption of homogeneous types players, we
may get similar results also under the assumption of heterogeneous types players.
The other important assumption that we use in our model is the positive information cost for
observing signal. Till now, all papers with a topic of herding or anti-herding assumed that there is no
cost for observing signal. So whether she will observe her signal or not is not considered as an important
problem. But for the topic of strategic behavior of players, we think players’ decision whether she will
observe her signal or not should be considered as the important question because the degree of herding
or anti-herding will be excessive especially if each player makes decision only based on the other player’s
announcement without her own signal. Also the free information cost assumption is not realistic because
we can ﬁnd many examples that people should pay cost for getting information. So we assert that the
information cost for getting signal should be regarded as an important factor in the analysis of players’
decision procedure. For example, if players should pay very high information cost for getting signal,
sometimes it is rational for players to behave without signal with giving up the opportunity to observe
signal. In this way, the information cost is strongly linked with player’s decision and this is the reason
why the information cost should be considered as an important factor. In this paper, we show that the
analysis under the information cost enriches the results of our analysis compared to other works.5
Finally, the belief in the information quality plays an important role in each player’s decision rule
in our model. Each player’s strategy can be expressed as the function of this, so we can get intuitive
results and interpretation.
Under above basic frameworks, ﬁrst, we analyze the simultaneous announcement and sequential
announcement cases separately and compare the results of those cases. First, we show that there exists
unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in a simultaneous announcement case. In this case, each player’s
best strategy is to report her signal truthfully. Second, under the assumption of sequential ordered
announcement, player’s best strategy depends on the information cost, payoﬀs and the belief in the
information quality. Here, we can check the the three factors, the incentive to be diﬀerentiated, the
negative eﬀect of the information cost and the blame sharing eﬀect. Let’s denote that γ is the reward
that the player gets if she is the unique player who made a correct announcement. Also let φ be the
penalty that she gets if she is the unique player who made a false announcement.
If the cost for getting information is suﬃciently greater than the critical level, the subsequent player
4For the brief summary about this type’s assumption for many papers that treated the topic of behavior with career or
reputation concern, please check Levy G. (2002), "Anti-herding and Strategic Consultation", p2-p5.
5According to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that discussed the role of information cost for the explanation of
strategic behavior with reputation concern.
3gives up the opportunity to observe signal and behaves strategically without signal. That is to say, only
blame sharing eﬀect works. Whether she will imitate ot deviate from the other player who moved ﬁrst
depends on the belief in the information quality.
If the given information cost is less than this critical level, we have some multiple results that depend
on the parameters. First, suppose that γ>φ . If the diﬀerence in the reward and penalty is not so high
(0 <γ− φ<2), her strategy set consists of three elements, observing signal, imitation or deviation
without observing signal. However the reward is relatively greater than the penalty (γ − φ>2),i f
the information cost is not suﬃciently low, her strategy set consists of three strategies again. But if
the information cost is not suﬃciently low, her strategy set consists of only two elements, observing
signal or deviation without signal. First, whether the strategy, deviation without signal, is included
in the strategy set or not is determined by the incentive to be diﬀerentiated. If γ>φ ,the incentive
to be diﬀerentiated exists always. Second, whether the incentive to be diﬀerentiated dominates the
negative eﬀect of information quality or not has an eﬀect on whether the strategy, observing signal with
informatin cost exists or not. If 0 <γ− φ<2 or γ − φ>2 with relatively high information cost,
we can ﬁnd the belief interval in which the strategy of observing signal is the element of the strategy
set. Finally, whether the strategy of imitation without sigmal is the element of the strategy set or not
also depends on whether γ is suﬃciently high or not. For a suﬃciently high γ, the incentive to be
diﬀerentiated dominates the blame sharing eﬀect. So the strategy of imitation without signal is not
included in the strategy set. But for γ which is not suﬃciently high, it is included in the strategy set.
That is to say, there exists belief in terval in which the blame sharing eﬀect dominates the incentive to
be diﬀerentiated.
Second, suppose that the penalty is greater than the reward. Then the subsequent player always
imitates the other player always. This comes from the reasoning that the greater penalty makes the
so-called blame-sharing eﬀect work and it induces her to imitate without signal always.
Finally, we discuss the welfare of using an waiting option with a view of ex-ante in an endogenous
ordering under incomplete information. Each player has an incentive to use the waiting option for
observing the other player’s announcement because this makes it possible for her to have more infor-
mation about true state. Moreover, because we assumed a positive information cost for getting signal,
there may exist an excessive tendency of using an waiting option. Choi (1997) discussed this problem,
so-called Penguin eﬀect, with the example of technology adoption in which players hesitate to experi-
ment a new but risky technology for the fear of being stranded. In his paper, it is asserted that, under
some conditions, using the waiting option in endogenous ordering causes the decrease of player’s welfare
compared to the simultaneous movement case. In our model, we specify the conditions under which
each player become better oﬀ or worse oﬀ from using the waiting option in an endogenous ordering
compared to the simultaneous case with a view of ex-ante.
First, if the information cost suﬃciently high and the reward is greater than penalty, whether waiting
option makes player better oﬀ or worse oﬀ depends on the values of reward and penalty. If the reward is
relatively greater than the penalty, the waiting option makes player worse oﬀ always.(Negative Penguin
eﬀect). If not, player become better oﬀ from using waiting option. (Positive Penguin eﬀect) Second, if the
penalty is greater than the reward, the waiting option makes player better oﬀ always.(Positive Penguin
4eﬀect) Third, suppose that the reward is greater than penalty and the information cost is relatively
low. In this case, if the diﬀerence in the reward and penalty is not so high or if the information cost
is relatively high however the diﬀerence in the reward and penalty is high, the optimality of using the
waiting option depends on the probability of imitation and deviation without signal. Each player can
be better oﬀ from using the waiting option if Pr(Imitation) <Pr (Deviation).(Positive Penguin eﬀect)
Also she is worse oﬀ if Pr(Imitation) >P r (Deviation).(Negative Penguin eﬀect) If the information
cost is relatively low when the diﬀerence in the reward and penalty is high, using the waiting option
makes player better oﬀ always. (Positive Penguin eﬀect)
The last of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the case that there is no information
cost for getting signal. The simultaneous and exogenously ordered sequential cases are discussed and
each player’s best strategies are explained. In secti o n3 ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ei sa ni n f o r m a t i o nc o s t
for observing signal. Under this, we discuss each player’s best strategy when order of announcement
is given exogenously. In section 4, the welfare of using the waiting option in endogenous ordering is
discussed. Finally, in section 5, the applications of our model and some results of the experiment that
support our model are introduced.
2 Basic Framework
In this section, we describe a basic framework of information structure and Bayesian game that we will
use in our paper. Let N = {1,2} be a set of players, that is to say, there are two players, i and j in
this game. They have to announce the forecasting about the state of next period. We assume that
there are two true binary states in this game, Ω = {H,L}.6 Those states are mutually exclusive in the
sense that if one state happens, tho other state can’t happen. The prior probability of each state is
given by Pr(S = H)=P r ( S = L)=1
2 = ρ. Now each player can observe the signal that partially
reveals information about true state. I assume that these signals are independently distributed given
the state and each signal is binary, θ = h or θ = l. So the set of signal can be expressed by Θ = {θ = h,
θ = l} and there is a mapping τ : Ω −→ Θ. Each given signal partially reveals information in the
sense that Pr(θi = h | S = H)=p, Pr(θi = l | S = L)=p,Pr(θi = h | S = L)=1− p and
Pr(θi = l | S = H)=1− p. Here, p ∈ (1
2,1). This means that each player is certain about precision for
each signal that she observed, but not perfectly certain. Also this Pr(θi | S) can be interpreted as player’s
belief in the information quality. We assume the θ is a private signal, so each player doesn’t know whether
6The binary discrete signal space that we assumed in this paper is from the strong belief that people categorize the
announced information. Here, categorization means that how e v e rp e o p l eo b s e r v e da n n o u n c e di n f o r m a t i o nb a s e do nt h e
continuous signal space by both players, people will set the categorization in interpreting announced information such that
H or L. Especially, this can be understood as a reasonable assumption because we mainly focus on the strategic behavior
of players who announced information. For example, suppose that player i announced information ai =0 .8 based on
the continuous signal space θ ∈ [−1,1]. Now when player j wants to deviate from that announcement regardless of her
observed signal, aj =0 .7 or 0.6 will not be understood by people as alternative new information. So if player j wants
to be interpreted as the player who announced meaningful alternative information, that should be very extreme such as
aj ∈ [−1,0]. From this reasoning, we can regard our given discrete signal space as one that catches above intuition and
also makes our analysis simple. So we use discrete signal space instead of continuous signal space.
5the other player observed signal θ = h or θ = l, but the precision of each player’s signal is a common
knowledge, so each player believes that if the other player observes signal θ, the other player gives same
weight to that signal as she does. But the belief in the information quality is the common knowledge
in the sense that player knows that the other player has the same belief in the information quality
with her. Each player has a set of payoﬀ-relevant announcements and announcement set is denoted by
An(n = i,j). The utility function of each player is given as a risk neutral utility function, U(π)=π.
So the preference ordering Â∗
nof each player is deﬁned by a∗ Â∗
n b∗ i fa n do n l yi fUn(a∗) >U n(b∗) for
n = i,j. So our Bayesian game is characterized by
hN,Ω,(An),(Θn),(τn),(ρn),(Â∗
n)i for n= i,j.
Because each player is identical except for the signal that she gets randomly, our equilibrium is symmetric
one.
Now let’s deﬁne the payoﬀ of two players in this announcement game. The LHS matrix is for the
case that S = H and the RHS one is for the case that S = L.
S = H ai = h ai = l
aj = h 1,1 γ,−φ
aj = l −φ,γ −1,−1
S = L ai = h ai = l
aj = h −1,−1 −φ,γ
aj = l γ,−φ 1,1
Here, we assume that γ>1 and φ>1. The payoﬀs of each player depend on her announcement
and also the other player’s announcement. The above payoﬀs can be explained as follows. If both
players coincide in their announcement and the announcement correctly revealed the true information
about oncoming period, the payoﬀs of both players are 1. However the announcements of both agencies
coincide, both players’ payoﬀ is −1 if they announced false information. If the announcement of both
players are diﬀerent, the player who announced a correct information gets reward γ>1 and the other
player who made a mistake gets penalty −φ<−1. Here, the payoﬀs when both players coincided in
their announcement are normalized by 1 and −1.7
Finally, let’s deﬁne the concepts that we will use in this paper.8 Here, n = {i,j} and −n = j for i
and −n = i for j.
Deﬁnition 1: Truthful announcement: We say that player makes a truthful announcement
if an = θn.









b = γ.(φ>0,γ>0). Also we can set the diﬀerent value for the
case that both revelaed false information together or revelaed true information like −a,−b,d,c. But this assumption that
|πi(S 6= ai = aj)| = |πi(S = ai = aj)| makes our analysis easy and helps to get intuitive result in a simple way.
8For the terminologies, we use a term "imitation" instead of "herding" and use a term "deviation" instead of "anti-
herding". Usually, the models that treated strategic behavior assumed two players and two period game as assumed in
our model. But usually, herding and anti-herding are the deﬁnitions used for inﬁnite players or ﬁnitely many players in
long run periods. So using the term "herding" and "anti-herding" in models that treat two players game in two periods is
not suitable. So we use the term "imitation" instead of "herding" to deﬁne the situation that player selects same decision
with other players however the observed signals are diﬀerent. Also we use the term "deviation" instead of "anti-herding"
to deﬁne the situation that player selects diﬀerent decision from other players however the observed signals are same.
6Deﬁnition 2: Strategic Imitation: We say that player imitates the other player strategi-
cally if an = a−n,θ n 6= a−n.
Deﬁnition 3: Strategic Deviation: We say that player deviates from the other player
strategically if an 6= a−n,θ n = a−n
Deﬁnition 4: Strategic Imitation without signal: We say that player imitates the other
player without signal if an = a−n without θn.
Deﬁnition 5. Strategic Deviation without signal: We say that player deviates from the
other player without signal if an 6= a−n without θn.
In this paper, we want to tell by the concept of strategic behavior with signal and the one without
signal. Finally, we assume that we exclude the possibility of announcement by guessing by each player
without information.9
Assumption
There is no strategy of guessing in each player’s strategy set.
3 When there is no cost in observing signal.
In section 2, we assume that there is no cost for observing signal. So players who participate in this game
observe their signal always. In case of simultaneous announcement case, the only source of information
that each player can use is her observed signal. But in case of sequential announcement, the subsequent
player has more information because she can also observe the other player’s announcement together with
her own signal. But the player who announces ﬁrst has exactly same information with the simultaneous
announcement case. So there is no change in the best strategy of player who moves ﬁrst whether
announcement is made simultaneously or sequentially.
3.1 The optimal strategy under simultaneous announcement
Now suppose that each player has to make an announcement simultaneously. Now we can described our
game as follows. First, the player i,j observes the payoﬀ conditional on the true state. Also each player
observes her signal and behaves as an expected utility maximizer. Each one has two strategies and
decides whether she will announces truthfully or distort the given signal after considering the expected
utility. The forecasting announcement about the true state is made simultaneously. The game procedure
can be summarized as follows.
T1) Player i(j) observes the payoﬀs and her signal.
T2) Player i(j) decides whether she will announce truthfully or distort the observed signal.
T3) ai and aj are announced.
9The subsequent player’s decision based on the other player’s announcement is not the one by guessing. Also from this
assumption, the player who announces ﬁrst should observe her siganl always.
7T4) State S is realized and each player gets payoﬀ depending on her announcement, the other
player’s announcement and the true state.
We can model this simultaneous announcement problem as the Bayesian game with incomplete
information. Let’s deﬁne player i’s posterior belief Π about the state of the world given her own signal
θi as follows.
Πi ≡ Pr(S,θj | θi)
In this situation, each player has to consider the true sate and the other player’s signal under
the observed her signal because she can’t observe the other player’s signal. So the only source of
information updating about true state is her observed signal. So her posterior belief is described as
Πi ≡ Pr(S,θj | θi). Also Player i’s strategy can be deﬁned as
σi; {θi −→ ai given θi and Πi ≡ Pr(S,θj | θi)}
In our setting, Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of σ = {σn;n = i,j} and a beliefs µ = {µn :
n = i,j} such that µ is consistent with µ and σ in terms of Bayesian updating. Now let’s characterize
the equilibrium of simultaneous announcement case. From following proposition, we ﬁnd that there
exists unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the announcement is made simultaneously. Each player’s
best strategy is to report her observed signal truthfully without distortion always.
Proposition 1
Suppose that player i and j announce simultaneously. Then there exists unique Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium such that each player announces her signal truthfully without distortion always.
The proof of this proposition can be described simply as follows. First, let’s think about the belief
updating about the true state of player j. Now player j observes her own signal θj. Then player j


















(S = H,L and θi = hi,l i)
Then player j’s expected payoﬀ from choosing action ai when θj = hj is as follows.














Now suppose that player j observed that θj = h. Then player can select the strategy to report
truthfully or to deviate strategically from her observed signal. The payoﬀs depending on her strategy
can be described as follows. Here, LHS table is for the strategy to report truthfully and RHS is for the
8strategy to deviate from her observed signal.
πj 1 γ −1 −φ
S H H L L
Pr(·|aj) p2 p(1 − p) (1 − p)2 p(1 − p)
ai h l h l
aj h h h h
πj −φ −1 γ 1
S H H L L
Pr(·|aj) p2 p(1 − p) (1 − p)2 p(1 − p)
ai h l h l
aj l l l l
From above, we can check that
E(πj(S,ai,a j = hj | θj = h)) = p2 (φ − γ)+p(γ − φ +2 )− 1
E(πj(S,ai,a j = hj | θj = h)) = p2 (γ − φ) − 2pγ + γ
So ETπj(·) − ED(·)=( 2 p − 1){γ(1 − p)+pφ +1 } > 0. So player’s optimal strategy is to report
her signal truthfully. Also same reasoning is possible when θj = l. So we can say that the strategy
to announce signal truthfully dominates the strategy to deviate from the observed signal always if the
announcement is made simultaneously.
We can deﬁne the case of simultaneous announcement game as the benchmark. First, the suﬃcient
information provision is possible by both players. Also there is no distortion in the information provided
by both players. We will use this result of benchmark case again in the section 4 for the analysis of the
optimality of waiting option in the endogenous ordering compared to the simultaneous announcement
case.
Corollary 1
If the announcement is made simultaneously by both players, the changes in value of γ and φ have
no eﬀect on the best strategy of each player.
3.2 The optimal strategy under sequential announcement
Now let’s discuss about sequential announcement case. Suppose that the order of announcement is
given exogenously and there is a time lag in the announcement of both players. Let’s assume that
player i announces ﬁrst and player j announces later. We also assume that player who moves later
can observe the announcement of the other player who announced ﬁrst. Then the procedure of this
sequential announcement game can be summarized as follows.
T1) Player i enters to this game and observes payoﬀ.
T2) Player i decides whether she will announces truthfully or distort the observed signal and ai is
announced.
T3) Player j enters to this game and observes the payoﬀ and ai.
T4) Player j decides whether she will announce truthfully or distort her observed signal and aj is
announced.
T5) State S is realized and each player gets payoﬀ depending on both players’ announcements and
the realized true state.
9We can describe this sequential announcement problem as a Bayesian game with incomplete infor-
mation. First, let’s deﬁne follower’s posterior belief Πj (player j’s posterior belief Π) about the true
state given signal θj as follows.
Πj ≡ Pr(S | ai,θj)
We assume that there is one to one mapping from the action space to signal space. So player j can
infer the signal of player i after observing player i’s announcement. We denote this mapping of player
j as χ such that
χj : ai −→ θi
Now the strategy of player j who is a follower can be deﬁned as
σj; {θj −→ aj given θj and Πj ≡ Pr(S | ai,θj) ≡ Pr(S | χ(ai),θj)
Also the strategy of player i who moves ﬁrst can be deﬁned as follows.
σi; {θi −→ ai given θi and Πi ≡ Pr(S,ai | θj)
Then Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of σ = {σn;n = i,j} and a beliefs µ = {µn : n = i,j} such
that µ is consistent with µ and σ in terms of Bayesian updating. Here, we can check that, in case of
player i, there is no change in her decision process compared to the simultaneous announcement case.
So we can easily conjecture that there will be no change in her best strategy and this can be shown with
simple procedure. Now let’s characterize the equilibrium of this sequential announcement case. From
the analysis, we can get following result.
Proposition 2
Suppose that player i announces ﬁrst and player j announces later when there is no information






γ + φ + γφ+1
¢
1) If γ>φ ,there exists p∗ such that player j deviates strategically if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗) and announces
truthfully for p ∈ (p∗,1).
2) If γ<φ , player always announces truthfully for ∀p ∈ (1
2,1).
Proof
Suppose player i announced a1 = h a n dt h eg i v e ns i g n a lo fp l a y e rj is θ2 = h.(θi = ai = θj). In this
case, player j has two strategies to take. The ﬁrst is to report truthfully and the other is to deviate.
Following are the two tables of each strategy. The left one is for the truthful announcement and the
right one is for the deviation.


















10After entering this game, player j observes her own signal and player i’s announcement. Now
let’s see the expected payoﬀs of each strategy. So player j’s posterior belief can be deﬁned as follows
Pr(S | ai,θj).First, let’s think about the truthful announcement. Here, Pr(H | hi,h j) and Pr(L | hi,h j)
can be attained by following Bayesian updating respectively.





Pr(h,h | H)Pr(H)+P r ( h,h | L)Pr(L)
=
p2
2p2 − 2p +1
Pr(L | hi,h j)=
Pr(h,h | L)Pr(L)
Pr(h,h | L)Pr(L)+P r ( h,h | H)Pr(H)
=
(1 − p)2
2p2 − 2p +1
Now let’s denote that ETπj(·)=ETπj(S,ai,a j = h | ai,θj = h) and EDπj(·)=EDπj(S,ai,a j = l |
ai,θj = h). Then the expected payoﬀs depending on strategies are as follows.
ETπj(·)=
2p − 1
2p2 − 2p +1
, EDπj(·)=−
p2
2p2 − 2p +1
φ +
(1 − p)2
2p2 − 2p +1
γ
If we compare ETπj(S | ai,a j) and EDπj(S | ai,a j),
ETπj(·) − EDπj(·)=
p2
2p2 − 2p +1
(1 + φ) −
(1 − p)2
2p2 − 2p +1
(1 + γ)
Then whether ETπj(S | ai,a j) ≷ EDπj(S | ai,a j) depends on
(φ − γ)p2 +2 ( 1+γ)p − (1 + γ) ≷ 0
Now let’s denote f(p) as (φ−γ)p2 +2 (1+γ)p−(1+γ). Then there are two cases depending on γ and
φ.
Case 1) When φ>γ




4 > 0,f (1) = 1+φ>0. So we can check that f(p) > 0 for ∀p ∈ (1
2,1). That is to say, if
φ>γ ,E Tπj(S,ai,a j) >E Dπj(S,ai,a j). So player always reports the observed signal truthfully.
Case 2)
Now let’s suppose that γ>φ .Then we can ﬁnd that there exists p∗ such that f(p) < 0 if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗)





γ + φ + γφ+1
¢
. That is to say,
(
ETπj(·) <E Dπj(·) if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗)
ETπj(·) >E Dπj(·) if p ∈ (p∗,1)
Finally, we can say as follows. Suppose that θj = ai. Then if φ>γ ,player who moves later always
reports her own signal truthfully. If γ>φ ,there exists p∗ such that player deviates strategically from
her signal if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗) and reports signal truthfully if p ∈ (p∗,1). So proved. Q.E.D.
Here, it is a interesting result that the subsequent player deviates from her observed signal however
the it coincides with the other player’s announcement if the belief in the information quality for her and
the other player is extremely low, p ∈ (1
2,p ∗).
Corollary 2
11Suppose that player i announces ﬁrst and player j announces later when there is no information cost.
Also θj = ai,γ>φand p ∈ (1





γ + φ + γφ+1
¢
1) As γ increases, the subsequent player has a more incentive to deviate strategically.
2) As φ increases, the subsequent player has a more incentive to announce truthfully.
Proof












γ + φ − 2
√





γ + φ + γφ+1
¢ > 0
because γ + φ − 2
√





γ + φ − 2
√





γ + φ + γφ+1
¢ < 0
So proved.
Now our second case is when θ2 6= a1. In this case, we get following result.
Proposition 3
Suppose that player i announces ﬁrst and player j announces later when there is no information cost.
Also the signal observed by player j coincides with the announcement by player i, θj 6= ai.
1) If γ>φ , player j announces her signal truthfully.
2) If γ<φ , player j imitates player i’s announcement after deviating from her observed signal.
Proof
We assume that ai = h and θj = l. Following are the payoﬀ tables according to player j0s strategy.
The left on is for the strategy to report truthfully and the right one is for the strategy to imitate the
other player.
πj(S,ai,a j) −φ γ




πj(S,ai,a j) 1 −1




In this case, the posterior belief player j about true state is updated as follows.



















Now let’s denote that ETπj(·)=ETπj(S,ai,a j = h | ai,θj = h) and EDπj(·)=EDπj(S,ai,a j = l |










So we ﬁnd following relation. (
ETπj(·) >E Dπ(·) if γ > φ
ETπj(·) <E Dπ(·) if γ < φ
So we can say that the strategy to announce truthfully dominates the strategy to deviate from observed
signal and imitate if γ>φ .But the strategy to imitate dominates the strategy to announce truthful
information if φ>γ . Q.E.D.
Now using above propositions, we shows that the best strategy of player who moves ﬁrst is to report
truthfully always.
Proposition 4
The player who has to announce ﬁrst makes the truthful announcement always.
Proof
We use the backward induction for analyzing the strategy of player who moves ﬁrst.
First, let’s think about the case that θj = ai. In this case, player i knows that player j will announces
her own observed signal truthfully if φ>γor if φ<γand p ∈ (p∗,1). Then this is the same case with
the simultaneous announcement for player i.S op l a y e ri will announce truthfully. Now let’s think about
t h ec a s eo fφ<γand p ∈ [1
2,p ∗]. Then player i knows that player j deviates strategically, so always
there is a diﬀerence between the announcements of two players. Suppose that θi = h. Then following
are the payoﬀ matrix of aj = h and aj = l.
πi(S,ai,a j) γ −φ




πi(S,ai,a j) −φ γ




Then ET(π)=pγ−(1−p)φ and ED(π)=−pφ+γ(1−p). So always ET(π)−ED(π)=( γ + φ)(2p − 1) >
0. So the player who announces ﬁrst reports truthfully if θj = ai.
Second, suppose that θj 6= θi and γ>φ , then player i knows that aj = θj 6= ai = θi, that is to say,
player i knows that player j will make the truthful announcement. Then from the same reasoning with
former case, the best strategy for player i is to make the truthful announcement. Now suppose that
θj 6= θi and γ<φ .Then player i knows that aj = ai 6= θj, that is to say, player i knows that player j
imitates the announcement of player i. Then there are two strategies that player i can take, truthful
announcement or the deviation from her observed information. Now suppose that player i observed
13θi = h. Then the payoﬀs of each strategy are as follows,
πi(S,ai,a j) 1 −1




πi(S,ai,a j) -1 1




H e r e ,t h eL H Sm a t r i xi sf o rt h ec a s et h a tp l a y e ri makes the truthful announcement and RHS one is for
the case that player i deviates after observing signal θi = h. In this case, Player i knows that player j
will imitate player i’s announcement. Then the expected payoﬀ for the truthful announcement is 2p−1
and that for the deviation is 1−2p. Now let’s denote that ET(·) is the expected payoﬀ of the strategy to
report truthfully and ED(π) is the expected payoﬀ of the strategy to deviate from observed signal. Then
it is obvious that player i will make the truthful announcement because ET(π) − ED(π)=4 p − 2 > 0
from the assumption p>1/2. Finally, we can say that player i’s best strategy is to make the truthful
announcement for all cases. Q.E.D.
Above proposition explains the condition of the optimal strategy of player who moves later. Espe-
cially, we can ﬁnd interesting result when there is a coincidence in her observed signal and the other
player’s announcement. Surprisingly, there is a positive possibility of strategic deviation however the
observed signal is same with the other player’s announcement. It says that the condition for this strate-
gic deviation is γ>φand p ∈
¡1
2,p ∗¢
. That is to say, if the reward when only one player was right is
greater than the penalty when only one player was wrong and the belief in the information’s quality is
very low, player who moves later deviates strategically. This possibility comes from two eﬀects. First, if
player believes that her observed information has very low level of quality, this player doesn’t give much
weight for this information. Also she will give small weight for the other player’s information quality.
Also, if γ>φ ,she has a strong incentive to deviate strategically because she can get greater payoﬀ with
the strategy of deviation for being diﬀerentiated. If p ∈ (p∗,1), this may not happen however γ>φ .In
case of γ<φ ,the fear of being penalized with a big penalty when she is the only one who announced
wrong information dominates the incentive to be diﬀerentiated with diﬀerent information.
Now let’s just discuss the case when there is a diﬀerence between the observed signal and the other
player’s announced information. Through the Bayesian updating, player j knows that the probabilities
of good state and bad state are equal. Then there is no incentive for player j to ignore her own given
signal because she gives equal weight for her information and the other’s one. So information quality
doesn’t matter in her decision in this case. Then her next criteria for selecting optimal strategy depends
on the relation of payoﬀs, γ and φ. Then if γ>φ ,the incentive to be diﬀerentiated makes her report
her signal truthfully But if γ<φ ,however she gives same weight to the signals of her and the other
player, the fear of being penalized makes her ignore her signal and imitate player i’s signal. That is to
say, the risk that she can be the only one player who announced wrong information makes her hesitate
to announce the diﬀerent information truthfully and this induces the imitation.
Finally, the information gain that player j got from sequential announcement is the perfect inference
of player i’s signal and the equal probability of two diﬀerent states induces her to select her strategy
14just depending on the given relation of reward and payoﬀ. Each player’s belief in the precision of the
other player’s information doesn’t matter in this case.
From above, the result of both players’ announcement can be described with a diagram as follows.
From this, we can check that there is a bias to the same announcements results and this can be inter-































Case when there is a coincidence in 
subsequent player’s observed signal 
and the other player’s 
announcement  
Case when there is a discrepancy 
in subsequent player’s observed 
signal and the other player’s 
announcement 
The result of the announcement by both players under the simultaneous announcment case.
4 When there is a positive cost in observing signal
In above section, we assumed that there is no cost in observing given signal. But this assumption can
be regarded as a too strong one when we think about reality. We can ﬁnd many examples that do not
compatible with this no information cost assumption. So in this section, we assume that players should
pay cost for observing their signal. This information cost can be understood as the time and money
the players should spend for getting information. If player has to pay positive information fee, we can
easily conjecture that player who moves later has new additional strategy, the announcement without
signal. This strategy should be regarded as a meaningful one under the existence of positive information
cost. If player doesn’t observe her own signal, there is a negative eﬀect in the sense that she misses the
opportunity to use meaningful information, her own signal, with which she infer the true state. Then
the only source of belief updating about true state is the announcement made by the other player who
moved ﬁrst. But there is also positive eﬀect because she can save the information cost and this positive
eﬀect may dominates the negative eﬀect more as the probability of correct announcement by the other
player increases. So in this case, the best strategy of player who moves later is strongly related with
the belief in the precision of the other player’s information. Here, the higher belief in the other player’s
information quality means the greater probability that the other player has a correct information.
Now let’s analyze the optimal strategy of the player who moves later. We already have mentioned
there is a possibility that player may have more incentive to behave without signal as the probability of
15correct announcement by the other player increases. We show that this conjecture is correct and asserts
that the value of the information cost also plays an important role in determining the optimal strategy
of the subsequent player.
In this section, we assume again that player i moves ﬁrst and player j moves later.
4.1 When the subsequent player observes her signal with paying information cost
This case can be easily analyzed from the result of section 2. In section 2, we already found the optimal
strategy of player who moves later. The only changed assumption is that player should pay cost for
getting information. But there is no change in her decision rule however there is a information cost
because the information fee can be considered as a sunk cost. The only thing that is changed is the
expected payoﬀ because c should be taken oﬀ. So the following decision rule of the subsequent player
is again the repetition of the former case when there is no information cost.
Decision rule of player j
1) Suppose that the signal observed by player j coincides with the announcement of player i.(θj = ai)





2) Suppose that the signal observed by player j doesn’t coincide with that of player i.(θj 6= ai). Then
1) If γ>φ , player j announces her signal truthfully.
2) If γ<φ , player j imitates player i’s announcement after deviating strategically from her signal.
If the reward when only one
Then player’s expected payoﬀs when the subsequent player follows above decision rules are as follows.
Case 1) When θj = ai
If γ>φ , p ∈ [p∗,1] or γ<φ ,player reports signal truthfully. So ETπj(S,ai 6= aj | θj = ai)=
2p−1
2p2−2p+1 − c.
Case 2) When θj 6= ai.
If γ>φ ,player reports the observed signal truthfully. So ETπj(S,ai 6= aj | θj 6= ai)=1
2(γ −φ)−c.
If γ<φ ,player imitates the other player strategically. So ETπj(S,ai 6= aj | θj 6= ai)=−c.
4.2 Optimal strategy of the subsequent player when she makes a decision without
signal
Now suppose that player j decided not to observe a signal. Then the only source of information that
she can use is the announcement by player i. Now suppose that player i announced ai = h.Then
player j has two strategies. The ﬁrst is the imitation without signal and the second is the deviation
without signal. Following are the matrix tables that show player j0s expected payoﬀ depending on her
strategy. LHS is for the strategy to imitate the other player’s announcement and RHS is for the strategy
16to deviate from the other player’s one.
πj(S,ai,a j) 1 −1




πj(S,ai,a j) −φ γ




In this case, the posterior belief of player j about true state is updated as follows.





Pr(h | H)Pr(H)+Pr(h | L)Pr(L)
= p
also





Pr(h | L)Pr(L)+Pr(h | H)Pr(H)
=1− p
Now suppose that player j imitates player i’s announcement without signal. Let’s denote that EM(·)
is the expected payoﬀ when she selects the strategy of imitation without signal. Then
EM
j (π(S | ai)) = 2p − 1.
Now suppose that player j deviates from player i’s announcement without signal. Then the expected
payoﬀ when player j selected the strategy of deviation from player i’s announcement is
ED
j (π(S | ai)) = −pφ +( 1− p)γ
Here, there is no change in posterior belief, Pr(S | ai), whether player j imitates or deviates. Now if
we compare the expected payoﬀs, we can get following proposition.
Lemma 1
Suppose that the subsequent player doesn’t observe signal.
1) If γ>φand p>
1+γ
2+γ+φ > 1




2, the subsequent player deviates from the other player without
signal.
3) If γ<φ ,player who announces later imitates the other player without signal for ∀p such that
p ∈ [1/2.1].
A b o v ep r o p o s i t i o nc a nb ep r o v e di nae a s yw a y .F i r s t ,EM(π(·))−EV (π(·)) = p(2+γ+φ)−(1+γ).
So if p>
1+γ
2+γ+φ, EM(π(·)) >E V (π(·)). So player j imitate. Also if
1+γ
2+γ+φ >p , EM(π(·)) <E V (π(·)).
So player j w i l ld e v i a t e .B u tw eh a v eac o n s t r a i n tf o rp such that p>1




we can ﬁnd that
1+γ
2+γ+φ > 1
2 if γ > φ and
1+γ
2+γ+φ < 1
2 if γ < φ. Finally, we can say that if γ>φand
1+γ
2+γ+φ <p<1, EM(π(·)) >E V (π(·)). Also if γ>φand 1
2 <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ,E M(π(·)) <E V (π(·)).Finally,
if γ < φ and p>1
2,E M(π(·)) >E V (π(·)) for all p>1




satisﬁed. So we proved.






                                                        







                                                      When γ <ф 
P=1/2  P=1  P=P*
Deviation without signal Imitation without signal
P=1/2  P=1 
Imitation without signal
The best strategy of the subsequent player when she decides not to observe her signal.
According to our proposition, if γ>φand 1
2 <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ, player j deviates from player i’s
announcement. That is to say, ai 6= aj. This explains following situation. Suppose that the reward
when only I was right is greater than the penalty when only I was wrong, γ>φ .Now if the belief
in the precision of other player’s information is bounded above by
1+γ
2+γ+φ, player strategically deviates
from the other player’s announcement. Here, the fact that player j’s belief in the player i0s information
quality is bounded above means that she doesn’t have a strong belief in the information quality. Here,
p is only the player i0s information quality because player j doesn’t observe her signal. Then player j
has much incentive to deviate from player i’s announcement from this weak belief in the other player’s
information. Especially, the incentive to be diﬀerentiated from the other player under γ>φmakes her
select the strategy of deviation.
Now think about second case. It says that If γ>φand
1+γ
2+γ+φ <p<1, player j imitates player
i’s announcement. Here, the condition
1+γ
2+γ+φ <p<1 explains that player j’s belief in the player i0s
information quality is bounded below by
1+γ
2+γ+φ and this means that she has a strong belief in player
i0s information. Then this will induce player j to imitate player i’s announcement. So we can say that,
in this case, the strong belief in other player’s information dominates the incentive to be diﬀerentiated
however γ>φ .Finally, if γ<φ ,player j imitates player i’s announcement always for any level of
p ∈ (1
2,1). Here, we can check the risk averse attitude to the situation that she can be the only one
player who made a mistake. That is to say, the blame sharing eﬀect works for any level of belief in the
information quality.
If we compare the behavior of player j when γ>φand γ<φ ,we can ﬁn da s y m m e t r yi nh e r
behavior to the risky situation. However there is no change in her decision procedure whether γ>φor
γ<φ ,player j shows a strong risky averse attitude to the situation that she is the only one who made
a false announcement and it is natural that this will be exaggerated when γ<φ .
From above, we also can get the following comparative statics that explains the eﬀect of change in
the payoﬀ on the best strategy of the subsequent player.
Corollary 3
Suppose γ>φand the player who announces later decided not to observe her signal.
181) As γ increases, the possibility of imitation without signal decreases and the possibility of deviation
without signal increases.
2) As φ increases, the possibility of imitation without signal increases and the possibility of deviation
without signal decreases.
This can be proved easily. First, suppose γ>φ .Then we know that player will imitate the other
player when
1+γ
2+γ+φ <p<1 and will deviate from the other player when 1
2 <p<
1+γ




γ + φ +2
Prob(Deviation)=
γ − φ
γ + φ +2
So from these, we can get that
∂Prob(Imitation)
∂γ
=( −2)(γ + φ +2 )
−2 (φ +1 )< 0
∂Prob(Deviation)
∂γ
=2 ( γ + φ +2 )
−2 (γ +1 )> 0
∂Prob(Imitation)
∂φ
=( −2)(γ + φ +2 )
−2 (γ +1 )< 0
∂Prob(Deviation)
∂γ
=2 ( γ + φ +2 )
−2 (φ +1 )> 0
Intuitively, we can check again that γ works for the incentive to be diﬀerentiated and φ works for the
blame sharing eﬀect.
4.3 The optimal strategy of the subsequent player when there is a positive infor-
mation cost
In this section, we discuss about the best strategy of player j who moves later when she has to pay
information cost for observing signal. In above, we checked the best strategy of the subsequent player
that depends on her decision whether she observer signal and or not. We already mentioned that the
value of of information cost will play an important role in her decision. So ﬁrst, we check the existence
of critical value of information cost on which her decision depends whether she will observe her signal
or not. Then we get player j0s best strategy that depends on payoﬀs and the belief in the information
quality.
Now we consider following four cases. Case 1) γ>φand
1+γ
2+γ+φ <E (p) < 1,C a s e2 )γ>φand
p∗ <E (p) <
1+γ
2+γ+φ,C a s e 3 ) γ>φand 1
2 <E (p) <p ∗, Case 4) γ<φ .After entering the game,
the subsequent player observes the information cost, c and the payoﬀs, γ and φ. Also she has the
expectation about the other player’s information quality. If she decides to observe her signal, this p
measures both her information quality and the other player’s information quality. If not, p measures
only this player’s belief in the other player’s information quality.
Also After entering game, she has to decide whether she will observe her signal or not. In case of the
decision to observe signal, she has no knowledge whether she will observe same signal with ai or not.
19So the expected payoﬀ of the decision to observe her signal is the results after considering both cases
ai = θj and ai 6= θj. But in case of the decision not to observe her signal, she knows whether she will
select the strategy of imitation or deviation without signal because she already knows γ,φ,c and E(p).
Following is the procedure of our game. Here, player i is the player who announces ﬁrst and player











Same signal  Different signal 








































Announcement  Different 
Announceme
4.3.1 Case 1) When γ>φand
1+γ
2+γ+φ <E (p) < 1
Suppose that γ>φand
1+γ
2+γ+φ <E (p) < 1. Now the subsequent player can decide whether she will
observe her signal or imitate. Here, the strategy of deviation is excluded because
1+γ
2+γ+φ <p<1. We
can conjecture that there may exist the critical level of cost such that if the given information cost is
less than critical level, she will take into account the strategy to observe her signal. If not, she will give
up the opportunity to observer her signal.
Suppose that p =
1+γ






if there is no cost for observing signal, player will always select the strategy of observing signal. But
because of the existence of positive cost for signal, ESπ(p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ) <E Iπ(p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ) is possible. From
now, we denote ESπ(p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ) as ESπ(·) and EIπ(p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ) as EIπ(·). Then ESπ(·) −EIπ(·) < 0






























































Then if c>ˆ c, EIπ(·) >E Sπ(·),s op l a y e rj will select the strategy of imitation without signal and
if 0 <c<ˆ c, she takes into account the strategy of observing signal as possible one.
Lemma 2
Suppose γ>φ , p>
1+γ
2+γ+φ and c>ˆ c. Then player who moves later always imitates the other
player’s announcement without signal.
Now let’s think about the case 0 <c<ˆ c.I fo u rg i v e nc is c ∈ (0,ˆ c), player’s strategy set consists
of two elements. The ﬁrst is to observe her signal and the second is to imitate without signal. Let’s
denote that the expected payoﬀ of the strategy to observe signal as ESπ and the one of the strategy to
imitate without signal as EIπ. Then we know that
ESπ(·) − EIπ(·)=−
(2p − 1)3
4p − 4p2 − 2
−
4c − γ + φ
4
In above formula, we can check
4c−γ+φ
4 < 0 if should be satisﬁed because
−(2p−1)3
4p2−4p+2 < 0 and this means
that c<
γ−φ
4 is a condition.
First, let’s denote f(p)=
−(2p−1)3
4p2−4p+2. Then we can check that this function is a decreasing function
for ∀p from
∂f(p)
∂p < 0. Also f(1
2)=0and f(1) = −1






2+γ+φ)). Then if we compare f(p) and
4c−γ+φ








































4 should be satisﬁed. So case a) is excluded in our analysis.











,E Sπ>E Iπ and if p ∈ (ˆ p,1),E Sπ<











2+γ+φ). If we think the conditions c>
γ−φ−2
4 ,c< ˆ c and c<
γ−φ
4 together, we can
get
γ−φ−2
4 <c<ˆ c because
γ−φ
4 > ˆ c. So we can say that if
γ−φ−2
4 <c<ˆ c, there exists p∗
3 such that
ESπ>E Iπ if p ∈ (
1+γ
2+γ+φ,p ∗
3) and ESπ<E Iπ if p ∈ (p∗
3,1).10















This case means that ESπ<E Iπ always. So player will imitates the other player without observing





4 . So if this is satisﬁed, player will imitate
the other player for ∀p ∈ (
1+γ
2+γ+φ,1). But this also depends on γ and φ because if γ −φ>2,
γ−φ−2
4 > 0,
but if γ − φ<2,
γ−φ−2
4 < 0.
Case c-1) 0 <γ− φ<2
Then case c) says that ESπ>E Iπ for ∀p ∈ [
1+γ
2+γ+φ,1] if 0 <c<
γ−φ−2
4 .
Case c-2) γ − φ>2





4 < 0 is meaningless.




2+γ+φ <p<1. Here, ˆ c = (6γ+6φ+8γφ+2γ2+γ3+2φ2+φ3+γφ2+γ2φ+4)(γ−φ)
4(2γ+2φ+γ2+φ2+2)(γ+φ+2) .
1) Suppose 0 <γ−φ<2. Then, for 0 <c<ˆ c, ∃ˆ p such that player who moves later reports truthfully
after observing signal if p ∈ (
1+γ
2+γ+φ,p ∗
3) and imitates the other player without signal if p ∈ (p∗
3,1).
2) Suppose γ − φ>2. Then, for
γ−φ−2
4 <c<ˆ c, ∃ˆ p such that player who moves later reports
truthfully after observing signal if p ∈ (
1+γ
2+γ+φ,p ∗
3) and player imitates the other player without signal
if p ∈ (p∗
3,1). Also, for 0 <c<
γ−φ−2
4 , player who moves later reports truthfully after observing signal
for ∀p ∈ (1
2,1).
This proposition says that if 0 <c<ˆ c , γ>φ , player’s optimal decision rule depends on the belief
in the other player’s information quality and payoﬀs. How can we interpret this intuitively? From the
formula, ESπ − EIπ, we can check that
∂(ESπ−EIπ)
∂p < 0.T h e n
∂(ESπ−EIπ)
∂p < 0 means that
p ↑=⇒ (ESπ − EIπ) ↓ and p ↓=⇒ (ESπ − EIπ) ↑ .
Also we can check ∂ESπ
∂p > 0 and ∂EIπ
∂p > 0. S ot h ef a c t" p ↑, (ESπ − EIπ) ↓ ” means that the
eﬀect of ∂EIπ
∂p dominates ∂ESπ
∂p . Here, for ∂ESπ
∂p , the increase in p means that the quality of information
increases. So the expected payoﬀ when she decides to observe her signal will increase. So this player
has more incentive to observe her signal as p increases. But also if we think about ∂EIπ
∂p , t h ei n c r e a s ei n
p means that the quality of information that the other player has is getting better. So ∂EIπ
∂p > 0 also
means that the expected payoﬀ when she decides not to observe her own signal and to imitate increases.
S ot h ef a c t" p ↑, (ESπ − EIπ) ↓ ” means however there is a positive eﬀect from the increase in p for
observing signal and also for imitation, the eﬀect of ∂EIπ
∂p dominates ∂ESπ
∂p . That is to say, if the given
quality of information is very high, the strategy of imitation is a better strategy compared to that of
observing signal, so player j will imitate. We also can apply same reasoning for p ↓, (ESπ − EIπ) ↑.
This means that as p decreases, the eﬀect of ESπ dominates the eﬀect of EIπ. So we can infer that if
the given p is relatively low in p ∈ (
1+γ
2+γ+φ,1),p l a y e rj has more incentive to observe her signal however
she has to pay information cost. Then we can check again the existence of ˆ p such that ESπ(ˆ p)=EIπ(ˆ p)
intuitively.
224.3.2 Case 2) When γ>φand 1
2 <p<p ∗
Now our second case is when γ>φand 1
2 <p<p ∗. From our game tree, we can check there is a
diﬀerence in the announcements by both players always. First if the subsequent player j observes her
signal and θj = ai,a i 6= aj because she deviates from her observed signal. Also if θj 6= ai,a i 6= aj again
because she reports truthfully. However she doesn’t observe her signal, she just deviates from the other
player’s announcement for the extremely low level of belief in the other player’s information quality. So
ai 6= aj. That is to say, always ai 6= aj and there is no reason for her to observe her signal with positive
information cost. So we can say follows.
Proposition
Suppose that γ>φand 1
2 <p<p ∗. Then the subsequent player doesn’t select the strategy of
observing signal.
Now however we know the best strategy of the subsequent player when γ>φand 1
2 <p<p ∗, let’s
do a following procedure. Later in case 3), we will use the condition that we get from this procedure
for solving the function that is not the closed form. Now let’s think about the case that γ>φand
1
2 <p<p ∗. In this case, player announces diﬀerent information from the other player whatever her
observed signal it is. Especially, she deviates from her signal however she observes same signal with the
other player if the belief in the information quality is extremely low, 1
2 <p<p ∗.







2p2 − 2p +1
φ +
(1 − p)2











2p2−2p+1γ − c and ES
different =
γ−φ
2 − c with
Prob(same S)=Prob(different S)=1
2. Here, ES
same is the expected payoﬀ when she observes same
signal and ES
different i st h eo n ew h e ns h eo b s e r v e sd i ﬀerent signal.
Second, the expected payoﬀ when she doesn’t observe her signal is








2p2 − 2p +1
φ +
(1 − p)2





− c − (−pφ +( 1− p)γ)
So whether ES(π) ≷ ENS(π) or not depends on following formula,
p3 (4γ +4 φ)+p2 (−3γ − 5φ)+2 pφ + γ




(4c +3 γ + φ)
Let
h(p)=
p3 (4γ +4 φ)+p2 (−3γ − 5φ)+2 pφ + γ
4p2 − 4p +2





2 > 0. Also because p ∈
(1
2,p ∗),h (p) ∈ (1
4 (3γ + φ),h(p∗)). Then following three cases are possible. Case 1) h(p = 1
2) >h (p∗),
Case 2) h(p = 1
2) < 1
4 (4c +3 γ + φ) <h (p∗), Case 3) 1
4 (4c +3 γ + φ) <h (p = 1
2).
23Case 1) 1
4 (4c +3 γ + φ) >h (p∗).
From this, we can ﬁnd that if c>h (p∗) −
(3γ+φ)
4 ,E S <E NS for ∀p ∈ (1
2,p ∗)
Case 2) 1
4 (3γ + φ) < 1
4 (4c +3 γ + φ) <h (p∗)
From this, we can ﬁnd that if 0 <c<h (p∗) −
(3γ+φ)
4 , there exists p∗
4 such that ES <E NS for
p ∈ (1
2,p ∗
4) and ES >E NS for p ∈ (p∗
4,p ∗)
Case 3) 1
4 (4c +3 γ + φ) < 1
4 (3γ + φ)
This case is excluded because this is impossible.
So we can summarize above analysis as follows.
Result 1) Suppose h(p∗) > 1
4(3γ + φ).
If c>h (p∗) −
(3γ+φ)
4 ,E S <E NS for ∀p ∈ (1
2,p ∗).
If 0 <c<h (p∗) −
(3γ+φ)
4 , there exists ˜ p such that ES <E NS for p ∈ (1
2,p ∗
4) and ES >E NS for
p ∈ (p∗
4,p ∗).
Result 2) Suppose h(p∗) < 1
4(3γ + φ).
ES <E NS for ∀p ∈ (1
2,p ∗) and c>0.
But here, result 1) is excluded because we know that the subsequent player selects the strategy of
deviation without signal for ∀p ∈ (1
2,p ∗) and for ∀c>0 from the reasoning described above. So the





This condition will be used again in the analysis when γ>φ ,and p∗ <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ.
4.3.3 Case 3) When γ>φ ,and p∗ <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ
Suppose that γ>φand p∗ <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ. Now the subsequent player can decide whether she will observe
her signal or deviate without signal. Now we can conjecture that there may exist the critical level of
information cost under which she takes into account the strategy to observe her signal as a possible
option. If the information cost is greater than the critical level, she may give up the opportunity to
observer signal and she will deviate.
Let’s think about following case. If the information quality p is given as p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ, this is the







. So in this case, player may select the strategy
of observing signal if there is no information cost because the deviation without signal under the high
belief in the other player’s information quality is not optimal for her. But if we think about the existence












< 0 is possible if the
information cost is very high. From now, we denote ESπ(p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ) as ESπ(·) and EDπ(p =
1+γ
2+γ+φ)













that makes ESπ (·) − EDπ (·) < 0. So we can ﬁnd that if the given information cost is greater than the
critical level, ˇ c , player always selects the strategy of deviation without signal. If not player takes into
account the strategy of observing signal as possible one. Then we can get following proposition.
24Lemma 4
Suppose γ>φand p∗ <p<
1+γ










4 − γ +
1+γ
2+γ+φ(γ + φ),
player who moves later always deviates from the other player without signal.
Now let’s think the case c<ˆ c.I fc<ˆ c, the subsequent player’s strategy set consists of two elements.
The ﬁrst is to observe signal and the second is to deviate without signal. Let’s denote that the expected
payoﬀ of the strategy to observe signal as ESπ(·) and the one of the strategy to deviate without signal
as EDπ(·). Then
ESπ − EDπ =
2p − 1




− c − γ + p(γ + φ)
ESπ = EDπ ⇐⇒
2p − 1
4p2 − 4p +2
+ p(γ + φ)=
1
4
(4c +3 γ + φ)
Now let’s denote that g(p)=
2p−1
4p2−4p+2 + p(γ + φ). Then g(p) is a increasing function of p ∈
(p∗,
1+γ
2+γ+φ). Also we can get g(1
2)=
γ+φ
2 ,g(0) = −1
2 and g(1) = γ + φ + 1
2. Here, p ∈ [p∗,
1+γ
2+γ+φ],
so g(p) ∈ [g(p∗),g(
1+γ
2+γ+φ)]. Now if we compare g(p) and
3γ+φ
4 + c, following three cases are possible.
Case a)
3γ+φ
4 + c>g (
1+γ
2+γ+φ),C a s eb )g(p∗) <
3γ+φ
4 + c<g (
1+γ
2+γ+φ) and Case c)
3γ+φ
4 + c<g (p∗).
Case a) When
3γ+φ
4 + c>g (
1+γ
2+γ+φ)




4 + c, g(
1+γ
2+γ+φ) − 1
4 (4c +3 γ + φ)
= (6γ+6φ+8γφ+2γ2+γ3+2φ2+φ3+γφ2+γ2φ+4)(γ−φ)
4(2γ+2φ+γ2+φ2+2)(γ+φ+2) − c. Now let’s denote
(6γ+6φ+8γφ+2γ2+γ3+2φ2+φ3+γφ2+γ2φ+4)(γ−φ)













4 + c should be satisﬁed.
Case b) When g(p∗) <
3γ+φ
4 + c<g (
1+γ
2+γ+φ)
This case means that there exists p∗
2 such that if p ∈ (p∗,p ∗




ESπ>E Dπ. From g(p∗) <
3γ+φ
4 + c, we can get c>g (p∗) −
3γ+φ
4 and
c<ˇ c = (6γ+6φ+8γφ+2γ2+γ3+2φ2+φ3+γφ2+γ2φ+4)(γ−φ)
4(2γ+2φ+γ2+φ2+2)(γ+φ+2) from
3γ+φ
4 + c<g (
1+γ
2+γ+φ). Finally, if we think
the range of c, g(p∗) −
3γ+φ
4 <c<ˇ c is derived.
1) Suppose g(p∗) >
3γ+φ
4 . Then for g(p∗) −
3γ+φ
4 <c<ˇ c, there exists ˇ p such that if p ∈ (p∗,p ∗
2),




2) Suppose g(p∗) <
3γ+φ
4 . Then for 0 <c<ˇ c, there exists ˇ p such that if p ∈ (p∗,p ∗
2),E Sπ<E Dπ






4 + c<g (p∗)
Case c) is excluded.
Finally we can get following results from above analysis when γ>φ ,p ∗ <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ
Result 1) Suppose g(p∗) >
3γ+φ
4 . Then for g(p∗) −
3γ+φ
4 <c<ˇ c, there exists ˇ p such that if
p ∈ (p∗,p ∗




25Result 2) Suppose g(p∗) <
3γ+φ
4 . Then for 0 <c<ˇ c, there exists p∗
2 such that if p ∈ (p∗,p ∗
2),




Now let’s check g(p∗)=h(p∗). We know that
g(p)=
2p − 1
4p2 − 4p +2
+ p(γ + φ)
h(p)=
p3 (4γ +4 φ)+p2 (−3γ − 5φ)+2 pφ + γ
4p2 − 4p +2
S o ,i fw el e tχ(p)=g(p) − h(p),
χ(p)=
¡
2p − γ +2 pγ − p2γ + p2φ − 1
¢
2(2p2 − 2p +1 )





γ + φ + γφ+1
¢




Now in case 2), when γ>φand 1
2 <p<p ∗, we showed that the unique condition that is satisﬁed
is h(p∗) < 1
4(3γ + φ). Then from g(p = p∗)=h(p = p∗), the unique condition is g(p∗) <
3γ+φ
4 . So from
this, result 1) is excluded and the only possible one is result 2). So we can simplify the best strategy of




Suppose γ>φ ,p ∗ <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ Then for 0 <c<ˇ c,t h e r ee x i s t sp such that if p∗
2 ∈ (p∗,p ∗
2),
ESπ<E Dπ and if p ∈ (p∗
2,
1+γ
2+γ+φ),E Sπ>E Dπ. So the subsequent player always observes signal in
this case.
4.3.4 Optimal strategy of the subsequent player when γ>φ
First, we can get following lemma that explains the best strategy of the subsequent player when γ>φ








2+γ+φ Then for 0 <c<ˇ c,t h e r ee x i s t sp∗
2 such that if p ∈ (p∗,p ∗






2 <p<p ∗. Then for 0 <c<ˇ c, ES <E NS for ∀p ∈ (1
2,p ∗)
From this, we can get following results that explains the equilibrium of the subsequent players’
strategy when γ>φand p ∈ (1
2,1).
26Proposition 5




Imitates without signal if p ∈ (
1+γ
2+γ+φ,1)





Suppose that γ>φand 0 <c<c ∗. Then the best strategy of the subsequent player can be described
as follows.





Imitates without signal if p ∈ (p∗
3,1)
Observes signal if p ∈ (p∗
2,p ∗
3)
Deviates without signal if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗
2)








Imitates without signal if p ∈ (p∗
3,1)
Observes signal if p ∈ (p∗
2,p ∗
3)
Deviates without signal if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗
2)





Observes signal if p ∈ (p∗
2,1)
Deviates without signal if p ∈ (1
2,p ∗
2)
Now above decision rule can be described as follows as a function of belief in the information quality.





  P=1/2  P=1  P=(1+γ)/(2+γ+Φ) 
Deviation without signal  Imitation without signal 
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When γ − φ>2,0 <c<
γ−φ−2
4
The ﬁrst diagram is about the best strategy of the subsequent player for c>c ∗ and other are for the
case 0 <c<c ∗. So in case of c>c ∗ , the subsequent player’s best strategy is the imitation or deviation
without signal because she gives up the opportunity to observe her signal because of the high infor-
mation cost. In this case, the only source of information that this player can use is the other player’s
announcement. If player behaves without her signal, her best strategy may depend on the belief in the
other player’s information quality, p.S oi fp is greater than the critical, p∗ =
1+γ
2+γ+φ, this relatively high
l e v e lo fb e l i e fi nt h eo t h e rp l a y e r ’ si n f o r m a t i o nw i ll make her follow the other player’s announcement.
Also if p is less than the critical level, p∗ =
1+γ
2+γ+φ, this relatively low level of belief will make her deviate
from the other player’s announcement. Here, the negative eﬀect of the information cost works.
Now other diagrams explain the best strategy of the subsequent player when c<c ∗. In this case,
player has an incentive to observe the signal because the information cost is not so high. Also the
decision whether she will observe signal or not depends on the belief in the other player’s information
quality and the payoﬀs γ and φ. Now there are some points that we should mention for the diagrams
under c<c ∗.
First, if 0 <γ− φ<2, her strategy set S is S = {DNS,SG,INS}11. That is to say, however she
can make use of the opportunity to get reward by being diﬀerentiated from γ>φ , there exists the belief
interval in which player imitates without signal.
Second, if γ − φ>2 and
γ−φ−2
4 <c<c ∗, her strategy set S is S = {DNS,SG,INS} again. But if
0 <c<
γ−φ−2
4 <c ∗, there is no interval of the belief in which the subsequent player imitates without
signal. So in this case, S = {DNS,S}. This means that the incentive of being diﬀerentiated dominates
the the negative eﬀect of information cost. Here, the critical level of information cost is ¯ c = 1
4(γ−φ−2)
where (0 < ¯ c<c ∗).
11Here, DNS denotes deviation without signal, SG does observing signal and INS does imitation without signal
respectively.
28Now we can infer that three factors, the incentive to be diﬀerentiated, the negative eﬀect of the
information cost and the balme sharing eﬀect works in determining the decision rule of the subsequent
player. First, whether the strategy s = {DNS} ∈ S or s = {DNS} / ∈ S is determined by the incentive
to be diﬀerentiated. In above, if γ>φ ,the incentive to be diﬀerentiated exists always because the
strategy s = {DNS} ∈ S whether 0 <γ− φ<2 or γ − φ>2. Second, whether the incentive to
be diﬀerentiated dominates the negative eﬀect of information quality or not has an eﬀect on whether
s = {SG} ∈ S or s = {SG} / ∈ S. Above result says that there exists the interval of the belief in
which the incentive dominates the negative eﬀect of the information quality always. For example, if
0 <γ− φ<2 or γ − φ>2 and
γ−φ−2
4 <c<c ∗,s= {SG} ∈ S for p ∈ (p∗
2,p ∗
3). Also if γ − φ>2,
0 <c<
γ−φ−2
4 <c ∗,s= {SG} ∈ S for p ∈ (p∗
2,1). Whether s = {SG} ∈ S for p ∈ (p∗
2,p ∗
3) or p ∈ (p∗
2,1)
depends on whether γ is suﬃciently high or not. Finally, whether s = {INS} ∈ S or s = {INS} / ∈ S
also depends on whether γ is suﬃciently high or not. For a suﬃciently high γ, s = {INS} / ∈ S. That is
to say, the incentive to be diﬀerentiated dominates the blame sharing eﬀect. But for not a suﬃciently
high γ, s = {INS} ∈ S. That is to say, there exists belief in terval in which the blame sharing eﬀect
dominates the incentive to be diﬀerentiated.
4.3.5 Optimal strategy of the subsequent player when γ<φ
Now suppose that γ<φ .If player who moves later decides not to observe signal, she always imitates
the other player. And the expected payoﬀ of selecting strategy to imitate without signal is
EIπ =2 p − 1




ES(π | θj = ai)+
1
2


















4p2 − 4p +2
− c
Then we can ﬁnd that player who moves later imitates the other player without signal always.
Proposition 7
Suppose γ<φ .Then the subsequent player always imitates the other player’s announcement without
observing her own signal.
Proof
We know that ESπ =
2p−1
4p2−4p+2 − c and EIπ =2 p − 1. So
ESπ − EIπ =
−(2p − 1)3
(2p − 1)2 +1
− c<0
So player who moves later imitates the other player without observing her signal always.
A b o v er e s u l ts a y st h a ti fγ<φ ,the strategy of player who moves later does not depend on the belief
in the other player’s information. Our result says that if the penalty is greater than the reward, player
29has a risk-averse attitude for the case that she is the unique player who made a mistake in forecasting.
So her best strategy is to imitate the other player always. Only blame sharing eﬀect works.
.
4.3.6 Optimal strategy of the player who moves ﬁrst
Now let’s discuss about the best strategy of player who moves ﬁrst. In our example, we assumed that
player i moves ﬁrst. From backward induction, we can check that the best strategy of player who moves
ﬁrst is to reports truthfully after observing signal..
Proposition 8
The player who announces ﬁrst reports truthfully her observed signal always.
Proof
Now let’s assume that player i announces ﬁrst and the player j announces later.
Case 1) When the subsequent player imitates without signal
Now suppose that player i observed the signal hi. Then we can set up following payoﬀ matrix
for each strategy, to report truthfully and to announce distorted information, that is to say, deviates
strategically. (The LHS table is for the strategy to announces truthfully and RHS one is for the case
that player i announces distorted information.)
πi 1 −1









Then the expected payoﬀ when player i announces truthfully is ET(πi)=2 p − 1 and the expected
payoﬀ when player i announces distorted information is EF(πi)=1− 2p. So we can check that it is
better always for player i to announce truthfully.
Case 2) When the subsequent player deviates without signal
Now suppose that player i observed the signal hi again. Then we can set up following payoﬀ matrix
for the each strategy to report truthfully or to announce distorted information. (The LHS one is for
the strategy to announce truthfully and RHS one is for the strategy to announce distorted information.
πi γ −φ









30Then the expected payoﬀ when player i announces truthfully is ET(πi)=pγ−(1−p)φ and the expected
payoﬀ when player i announces distorted information is EF(πi)=−pφ +( 1− p)γ. So it is better for
player i to announce truthfully because ET(πi) − EF(πi) > 0.12
Case 3) When the subsequent player observes her signal
Then this is the same case with the simultaneous announcement case. So again player i announces
truthfully.
Finally, we can say that player i announces truthfully always. Q.E.D.
So from above, we can check that the best strategy of player who moves ﬁr s ti st or e p o r tt r u t h f u l l y
her observed signal always.
5 Optimality of waiting option in the endogenous ordering with a
view of ex-ante under incomplete information
According to the classical literature about endogenous ordering, the endogenity of players’ movement
can cause the ineﬃciency compared to the simultaneous movement case. This ineﬃciency is caused
from the fact that the subsequent player can free-ride on the other player who moved ﬁrst because she
can infer information from observing the other player’s action. So every player has a tendency to delay
her decision. Same reasoning can be applied to our model. Each player has an incentive to announce
later because she can infer the signal of the other player from the announcement. Especially, if she is
the ﬁrst player who announces, she has to pay information cost for getting signal and this information
cost may aggravate player’s tendency to delay her decision.
Till now, many interesting topics were introduced for endogenous ordering problem in a strategic
game. The most prominent topic is about the players timing of movement when players have hetero-
geneous belief. Chamley and Gale(1994) and Zhang(1997) showed that the player who has the highest
belief in her information moves ﬁrst in the endogenous ordering game. Especially, Zhang(1997) discussed
this endogenous ordering problem with social learning literature together and showed that there is an
onset of information cascade just after ﬁrst mover’s decision. In his model, the player who moves ﬁrst is
the one who has highest belief in her information. Choi(1997) also explained the endogenous ordering
with a topic of the technology adoption under the network externality. In that paper, he explained
that if the endogenous ordering is given for the adoption of new but risky technology, this endogenous
ordering can make player be worse oﬀ and asserted that this loss of welfare is caused from the waiting
option for learning from the other player’s adoption.
In this section, we discuss the similar topic with Choi(1997), the welfare of waiting option in an
endogenous ordering game with a view of ex-ante and shows the complementary results with Choi(1997).
According to our result, the waiting option in an endogenous ordering can make player better oﬀ and
12Here, E
T(πi) − E
F(πi) > 0 because E
T(πi) − E
F(πi)=pγ − (1 − p)φ − (−pφ +( 1− p)γ) > 0 and this comes from





31also worse oﬀ compared to the simultaneous announcement. We will check the conditions that the
welfare of player with a view of ex-ante can be better oﬀ and worse oﬀ.
The frameworks of our analysis in this section are as follows. Suppose that there are two rounds in
this announcement game. After entering into this game, both players observe the value of information
cost and the payoﬀs, γ and φ. Our ordering of announcement is given endogenously. Because each
player can observe the payoﬀs and the value of cost, players behavior can be analyzed with the result
of exogenously ordering case. Each player can select the round in which she announces. But she
doesn’t know whether the other player will move in the ﬁrst round or not. Player should decide when
she will announce before the start of this game and the announcement is irreversible. So player has
only one time chance to announce. Suppose that player decides to announce in the ﬁrst round. Then
after the announcement in the ﬁrst round, she gets payoﬀ depending on the other player’s timing of
announcement. If the other player moves in the ﬁrst round together, she gets the payoﬀ just after the
ﬁrst round. If not, she waits in the second round and gets payoﬀ after the end of second round. Now
suppose that player decides to move in the second round. After the end of the ﬁrst round, we can
check whether there was an announcement by the other player in the ﬁrst round or not. If there was
no announcement, there is nothing she can observe, so the second period problem is same with the
initial period. If there was an announcement by the other player, she can observe the other player’s
announcement and selects her strategy. Here, each player has a trade oﬀ in her decision. If she announces
in the ﬁrst round, she can avoid the discount in her payoﬀ. But she can’t observe her the other player’s
announcement and also should pay information cost for observing signal. If she decides to announce in
the second round, her payoﬀ is discounted by δ. But there is a possibility that she can observe the other
player’s announcement, so her information set can be enriched. Also she can avoid the information cost
if she decides to behave strategically without signal. But that happens only when the other player has
already moved in the ﬁrst round. So there is an uncertainty.
From now let’s assume that we analyze the problem of player j. In following, U(·) represents uniform
distribution. Also πsi
sj denotes the expected payoﬀ when player j selects the strategy sj and the player
i selects the strategy si.
5.1 When γ>φand the cost for observing signal is high, c>c ∗.
Our ﬁrst case is when γ>φand c>c ∗. After entering in this game, both players observe payoﬀsa n d
the value of information cost. Now each player has to decide whether she will announce in the ﬁrst round
or in the second round. If she announces in the ﬁrst round, we already checked that her best strategy
is to observe her signal and report truthfully. If she decides to move in the second round, there are two
strategies that she can select. She imitates the other player who moved in the ﬁrst round without signal
if
1+γ
2+γ+φ <p<1 and deviates from the other player without signal if 1
2 <p<
1+γ
2+γ+φ. But the strategic
behavior without signal is possible only when the other player has already moved in the ﬁrst round.
If there were no announcements by both player, the second round is exactly same with the initial ﬁrst
round. Now we suppose that q is the probability each player believes that the other player announces in
the ﬁrst round whether she announces in the ﬁrst round or not. Also we assume that there is a discount
32in the payoﬀ if player makes an announcement in the second round by δ. Then we can set up the value





  P=1/2  P=1  P=(1+γ)/(2+γ+Φ) 
Deviation without signal  Imitation without signal 
Strategy of announcement in the ﬁrst round.
Let’s think about the strategy that she moves in the ﬁrst round. Then the value function of this
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In above formula, the ﬁrst term,
q
4(γ−φ), is the expected payoﬀ when both player i and j announce















the expected payoﬀ when player j moves in the ﬁrst round but player i delays her decision in the ﬁrst
round. Then player j’s expected payoﬀ depends on the other player’s strategy. If player i announces in
the second round, her strategies consists of two elements, imitation or deviation because c>c ∗.
First, let’s get player i0s probability of the deviation in the second round. Player i deviates in the
round two if 1
2 <p<
1+γ













. Through same reasoning, we can get the probability of imitation, Pr(Imitation)=
γ−φ
2+γ+φ. If
player i deviates from player j’s announcement in the round two, player j’s expected payoﬀ is
γ−φ
2 .I f
player i imitates, the expected payoﬀ is 0. Finally, because she decides to announce in the ﬁrst round,
she has to observe her signal with paying information cost c.
Strategy of announcement in the second round.
Now, let’s think about the strategy that player j moves in the second round. In this case, the value





























Here, δ is the discount factor for the announcement in the second round and q is the probability that
the other player announces in the ﬁrst round again. If player j decides to announce in the second round,
she can observe the other player’s announcement with probability q. But with probability, 1−q, player
33i doesn’t announce in the ﬁrst round and player j has same problem again with the initial period in





is player j0s probability of deviation.
First, we can check that there exists a unique q∗ ∈ (0,1) such that V1(q∗)=V2(q∗) from following
proposition.
Lemma 8











2 )=B. Then we can write above value functions as follows.
V1 = q[A]+( 1− q)[B] − c
V2 = δq[B]+δ(1 − q)V
Then if we set, V1 = V2,




[δV + B + c]
δB + c − A
Here, RHS formula,
[δV +B+c]
δB+c−A is independent of q and only LHS formula is a function of q. Also the
numerator, q,is a increasing function of q and denominator, 1 − q, is a decreasing function of q.So we
can ﬁnd that there exists q∗ such that V1(q∗)=V2(q∗).
Now let’s discuss about the optimality of using waiting option in an endogenous ordering. We
already mentioned that the simultaneous announcement case can be regarded as a bench mark case
because both players’ information can be aggregated and there is no distortion in reported information
by both players. So we will compare the value of endogenous ordering when she can use the waiting
option and the value when she has to announce simultaneously. From this, we can check the welfare of
player when she can use the waiting option with a view of ex-ante.
Let’s compare the value of above mixed equilibrium result with simultaneous announcement case.
We know that there exists q such that V = V1(q∗)=V2(q∗). Now let’s denote the value of simultaneous
announcement case as V11. Then the player’s problem can be represented as follows.











































Then we can get the following results from above problem.
34Proposition 9
Suppose that γ>φ , c>c ∗ = (6γ+6φ+8γφ+2γ2+γ3+2φ2+φ3+γφ2+γ2φ+4)(γ−φ)
4(2γ+2φ+γ2+φ2+2)(γ+φ+2) .
1) If γ<3φ +2 , the waiting option makes each player better oﬀ compared to the simultaneous
announcement case.


























































V11 <V 1 if 0 <γ− 3φ<2
V11 >V 1 if γ − 3φ>2
So we proved. Q.E.D.
Above proposition says that if the reward is not so high compared to the penalty, γ<3φ +2 , the
waiting option in her decision makes this player better oﬀ. On the contrary if not, that waiting option
makes player worse oﬀ. Here, If the reward is not so high, player doesn’t have much incentive to be
the unique player who announces the correct information compared to the case when the reward is
relatively high. Then it will be better for her to delay her decision for the observation of the other
player’s announcement. In that way, there is a positive Penguin eﬀect. But if γ>3φ +2 , the negative
Penguin eﬀect exists.
5.2 When γ<φ
Now suppose that each player observes γ<φ .If γ<φ ,player who moves later always imitates the other
player who moved ﬁrst. Let’s suppose again that q is the probability that the other player announces
in the ﬁrst round. Then we can set up the value function of player j as follows. Here, V
j
1 is the value
35function of strategy that moves in the ﬁrst round and V
j
2 is the value function of the strategy that
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I +( 1− q)V =( 1− q)V
Let’s think about V
j





is the player j0s expected payoﬀ when player i also
moves in the ﬁrst round with probability q. The second term, (1−q)V, is the expected payoﬀ when the
other player doesn’t announce in the ﬁrst round with probability 1 − q. Now we can check again that
there exists equilibrium q∗ such that V1(q∗)=V2(q∗) is satisﬁed. So we will skip that proof.
Now the player’s problem is























Then we can get following results.
Lemma 9
In above formula, ∃ q∗ such that V1(q∗)=V2(q∗).















because γ<φ .So V11 <V 1 always. This means that the waiting option makes players better oﬀ always.
So we can get following proposition.
Proposition 10
Suppose γ<φ .Then the waiting option caused from endogenous ordering makes players better oﬀ
compared to the simultaneous announcement case.
This proposition says that using the waiting option in an endogenous ordering makes player better
oﬀ compared to the simultaneous announcement case if γ<φ .This is a very interesting result. Usually,
using waiting option for delaying her decision in an endogenous ordering is understood as the main reason
to make players worse oﬀ compared to the simultaneous case. We already know that player imitates the
other player if γ<φwhen she is a player who moves later. That is caused from the fact that player has a
strong risk aversion to the situation that she is the only one player who announced the false information.
36In this case, if she can delay her decision and can observe the other player’s announcement, she can
avoid the case that she is the only one player who announced false announcement. In that sense, the
possibility of waiting option makes player better oﬀ compared to the simultaneous announcement case.
We have to be careful in interpreting this result that, here, the meaning of being better oﬀ is about
the individual welfare with a view of ex-ante. So the possibility of avoiding severe penalty by herself
makes player being better oﬀ compared to the simultaneous announcement case. The information cost
makes the expected value of using waiting option greater because she has to pay information cost for
the announcement in the ﬁrst round. So in this case, the information cost increases the possibility of
the positive penguin eﬀect.
5.3 When γ>φand the cost for observing signal is not so high, c<c ∗
In last section, we checked that there are four possibilities in the subsequent player’s best strategy
when γ>φand c<c ∗. The point that we have to be careful is that however the subsequent player
observes her signal with a positive information cost, whether she reports truthfully or not depends on
her observed signal. That is to say, when player j is a subsequent player, she announces her signal
truthfully if θj 6= ai.B u ti fθj = ai, she reports her signal truthfully if p>p ∗ and deviates from her


















P=P3* P=P2* P=P* 
In this case, the critical value above which player j observes her signal p∗
2 >p ∗. So whether θj 6= ai
or θj = ai, she always reports truthfully if she decides to observe her signal.
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2 (q∗) and the player’s problem can
be deﬁned as follows.























































































So whether V11 ≷ V
j


























(φ − γ)(2p2 +2 p3 − 3) ≷ 0
So we can check whether f(γ,φ) ≷ 0 depends on 2p2 +2 p3 − 3 ≶ 0. Here, 2 < 2p2 +2 p3 < 4 from
1
2 <p 2,p 3 < 1.
So if p2 + p3 > 3
2,f<0= ⇒ V11 <V
j
1 (q∗) and if 1 <p 2 + p3 < 3
2,f>0= ⇒ V11 >V
j
1 (q∗).
So in case 1), the waiting option makes player better oﬀ if p2+p3 > 3










  P=1/2  P=1 
 






Again, the critical value above which player j observes her signal p∗
2 >p ∗. So whether θj 6= ai or
θj = ai, she always reports truthfully if she decides to observe her signal.
















































































2 (q∗) and from this




















































































So whether V11 ≷ V
j




























2 − 1) < 0
So in case 2), always using the waiting option makes player better oﬀ compared to the simultaneous
announcement case.
So from the results of case 1) to case 4), we can get following results.
Result
Suppose that γ>φand c<c ∗. In case 1), the waiting option makes player better oﬀ if p2 +p3 > 3
2
and worse oﬀ if 1 <p 2 + p3 < 3
2. In case 2), always using the waiting option makes player better oﬀ
compared to the simultaneous announcement case.
Here, case 2) and case 4) are the ones that there is no probability of strategic imitation without
signal. So our results say that using the waiting option makes player better oﬀ always compared to
the simultaneous announcement case in that case. In case 1) whether the waiting option makes player
better oﬀ or worse oﬀ depends on the value of p2 +p3 What is the intuition of this condition? First we
prove following claim.
Claim
1) p2 + p3 > 3
2 ⇐⇒ Pr(Imitation) < Pr(Deviation) and p2 + p3 < 3
2 ⇐⇒ Pr(Imitation) >
Pr(Deviation).
Proof
In following let’s denote that Pr(I)=P r ( Imitation), Pr(D)=P r ( Deviation) and Pr(S)=P r ( Observing
Signal).
1) First, let’s think about the condition p2 + p3 > 3
2 of case 1).
39Then p2 + p3 > 3
2 ⇐⇒ p2 − p3 > 3
2 − 2p3 ⇐⇒ 2(p3 − p2) < 4p3 − 3
⇐⇒ 2(p3 − p2) < −
£




p2 + p3 >
3
2
⇐⇒ Pr(S) < −[Pr(I) − (1 − Pr(I))] = 1 − 2Pr(I)
So
2Pr(I) < 1 − Pr(S)=P r ( I)+P r ( D)
⇐⇒ Pr(I) < Pr(D)
So
p2 + p3 >
3
2
⇐⇒ Pr(Imitation) < Pr(Deviation)
p2 + p3 <
3
2
⇐⇒ Pr(Imitation) > Pr(Deviation)
From above claim, we can check that the conditions that using the waiting option makes player
better oﬀ or worse oﬀ are the relations between the probability of imitation and the probability of
deviation. So we can rewrite our results as follows and we can get the interesting result that the waiting
option in an endogenous ordering makes player better oﬀ compared to the simultaneous announcement
case.
Proposition 11
Suppose that γ>φ .
1) If γ<φ+2,∀ c ∈ (0,c ∗) or γ>φ+2,
γ−φ−2
4 <c<c ∗, the waiting option makes player better oﬀ
compared to the simultaneous announcement case if Pr(Imitation) < Pr(Deviation) and worse oﬀ if
Pr(Imitation) > Pr(Deviation).
2) If γ>φ +2 ,0 <c<
γ−φ−2
4 , the waiting option makes player better oﬀ compared to the
simultaneous announcement case always.
6 Related literature with experiment
In this section, we introduce three papers that treated related topic. From these, we can ﬁnd the results
of experiments that support our model and also we can give an alternative explanation to the results
of those experiments with a diﬀerent view.
Derothea & Georg (2002) (from now, DG) introduced the experiment that discusses the failure
of information cascade with limited depth of reasoning. Anderson &Holt (1997)(from now, AH) is an
initiative paper that treated the topic of the formation of the information cascade with experiment. The
most big diﬀerence in those two papers are the existence of information cost that is also an important
assumption in our paper. In AH paper, players pay no information cost for observing signal and it
says that the formation of information cascade can be checked with experiment. According to this
40paper, in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrst player buys a signal and makes a decision based on this
signal. Then all subsequent players follow the ﬁrst player’s decision. So no further signals are revealed
and cascade happens with certainty. DG changes the no information cost assumption and asserts that
there is a diﬀerence in a formation of information cascade when players should pay information cost
for observing signal. In this paper, the meaning of information cost is interpreted with a diﬀerent view
from our paper. Here, the information cost is interpreted as a main source that subsequent players
can’t believe the truthfulness of predecessor’s decision.13 So this makes player who moves later observes
her signals and makes a decision based on this. But the observing signal happens only for players who
moves relatively early. If the order is relatively late, players are conﬁdent that previous decisions were
made based on private signal and herd occurs.
Now how can we apply the results of this paper into our model? First, this paper introduced an
error rate in the player’s belief on the decision making procedure of other players’ reasoning. Then this
can be interpreted as the partial precision of given signal in our model. Because player in our model
doesn’t give 100% certainty to the other player’s information, this plays a same role with the error rate
of DG paper. In DG paper, the result that players who moves early observe their signal under positive
information cost is explained by the reasoning that players doesn’t give much weight to other player’s
decision for her giving high error rate to other players’ decision. Then this is exactly coincides with the
result of our model that player who moves later doesn’t follow the announcement of player who moved
ﬁrst if the belief in the information quality is not so high. Of course, in DG model, the possibility of
deviation without signal is not considered in experiment. Also in our model, players give same weight
to the other player’s information. The factor that aﬀects her decision is the belief in the other player’s
information quality. But the assertion that player doesn’t believe the other player’s decision under some
condition is same. Also the other result of experiment in DG paper that players who moves relatively
later follow the decision of players who moved earlier when the majority of decision is formed can be
explained with the reasoning of our model. Our model says that player who moves later imitates the
other player without signal if the belief in the information quality is very high. The condition that
the majority of decision is formed by player who moved earlier in DG model can be interpreted as the
same condition with the high belief in the information quality in our model. The diﬀerences of our
model and DG paper are as follows. First, DG paper assumed that there is a limit in the Bayesian
information updating of players. So they introduced the error rate in interpreting the other players’
decision and this assumption is used for the explanation of experiment results. But in our model, we
assume that players are rational in the sense that they are perfect in Bayesian updating and use the
information available to her, but we show that the there is a possibility of strategic behavior of imitation
and deviation without signal. That is to say, the phenomena of imitation and deviation of our model are
the results of fully rational behavior, but the results of DG paper are the results of irrational behavior
with limited information updating. Finally, we strongly believe that to regard the option of deviation
without signal as one element of strategy set will deepen the results of experiment.
The second paper that is related with our model is Andreoni & Harbaugh & Vesterlund (2003).
This paper is about one shot proposer-responder game with a topic of systematic look at both reward
13In DG paper, truthfulness denotes the situation that player makes a decision based on observed signal.
41and punishment together. The main set up of this paper’s model is diﬀerent with that of ours. In this
game, proposers choose how much to share of a ﬁxed pie with others, so it talks about the relation
between selﬁshness and reward & punishment. They assert that the cooperation, that is to say the least
selﬁshness, is strongly guaranteed when reward and punishment exist together. The punishment can
help by getting people to move away from perfect selﬁshness . Also the reward is essential in the sense
that it encourages further cooperation. So it says that when devising incentive systems, it is important
to recognize that both tools, reward and punishment, should be present. This point gives reasoning why
we have to give an asymmetry to payoﬀs for the case that she is the only one player who made a correct
announcement and when she is the only one player who made a false announcement. In other papers,
usually it is assumed that the reward when only one player is correct is symmetric with the punishment
when only one player was wrong. So γ = φ. But our model assume that there is an asymmetry in the
reward and penalty and analyze the strategic behavior of players under the conditions of γ>φand
γ<φ .As already mentioned, the best strategy of player who moves later in our announcement game
depends on the value of γ and φ and this deepen our analysis for the players’ strategic behavior. Also we
can check that the increase in γ and the decrease in φ increase the probability of truthful announcement
after observing signal when the information cost is not so high. Of course, the increase of γ and φ both
together deﬁnitely increases the probability of truthful announcement compared to the case that only γ
or φ increases separately. The meaning of "cooperation" in Andreoni & Harbaugh & Vesterlund (2003)
can be understood as the truthfulness in our model.
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